Habermas and the Project of Immanent Critique
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Habermas' motivating insight is that neither a transcendental or metaphysical solution to the problem of normativity, nor a merely hermeneutic reconstruction of historically given norms, is sufficient to clarify the normative foundations of critical theory. In response to this insight, Habermas develops a novel account of normativity which locates the normative demands upon which critical theory draws within the socially instituted practice of communicative understanding.
Although Habermas has claimed otherwise, this new foundation for critical theory constitutes a novel and innovative form of "immanent critique". To argue for and to clarify this claim, I offer, in section 1, a formal account of immanent critique and distinguish between two different ways of carrying out such a critique. In section 2, I examine Habermas' rejection of the first, hermeneutic option. Against this background, I then show, in section 3, that the Theory of Communicative Action attempts to formulate an immanent critique of contemporary societies according to a second, "practice-based" model. However, because Habermas, as I will argue in section 4, commits himself to an implausibly narrow view in regard to one central element of such a model -in regard to the social ontology of immanent normativity -his normative critique cannot develop its full potential (section 5).
The Concept of Immanent Critique
Whether a particular theoretical project should be described as "immanent critique" depends on the meaning of this term which, in spite of its importance, has rarely been clearly defined.
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Hence, before turning to Habermas' model, I will clarify what I mean by "immanent critique,"
and the theoretical commitments I take such a project to entail.
Critical theories -or at least, those varieties which locate themselves within the Frankfurt School tradition -generally derive some of their methodological commitments from Marx's early writings. Criticizing the Utopian tendencies of his time, Marx rejects all "dogmatic" forms of normative criticism, which postulate normative principles from a context-free, external vantage point. 2 However, criticizing Hegel, Marx also argues that social critique is not to be based on a reconstruction of "reason in history", but rather on an analysis of the material conditions of social reproduction. 3 Thus, insofar as we can attribute any normative project to Marx, he must envisage a form of criticism that draws on norms which already exist in objective social reality. 4 Many critical theorists have subsequently endorsed this broad strategy of justifying the normative standards of critique by reference to immanent potentials of social reality. In so doing, these theorists not only reject forms of moral constructivism and of moral realism that introduce norms from the "outside", but they also reject a merely "internal" application of those normative standards which are already accepted by their audience. Although these questions are seldom clearly distinguished, there have been numerous attempts to address the issues they raise. We can roughly divide these answers into two camps, which I will 2 Titus Stahl, "Habermas and the Project of Immanent Critique" Pre-review version -not suitable for citation.
term the "hermeneutic" and "practice-based" forms of immanent critique. This hermeneutic strategy is, however, not the only possible understanding of an immanent method of criticism. It can hardly be assumed, for example, that Marx would have been content with his theory being described as merely a new interpretation of the ideals of bourgeois liberty, pointing out some hitherto unacknowledged aspects of their meaning. Rather, Marx's theory is an example for the second, "practice-based" type of immanent critique. On this second view, the social critic must not only draw on the cultural meanings or the rules accepted in a given community, but also on his or her knowledge about its objective practices and institutions.
Practice-based immanent criticism thus presupposes that the structures and modes of interaction in a social community contain -beyond the explicit understanding of their participantsimmanent normative potentialities upon which a critic can draw. Clearly, not only Marx but also contemporary critical theorists like Axel Honneth belong to this second category, and, as I will argue, so does Jürgen Habermas.
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Although the hermeneutic and practice-based strategies represent two ends of a spectrum on which many intermediary positions can be found, distinguishing these strategies clarifies different potential responses to the three problems distinguished above. A hermeneutic-type strategy will answer the ontological question by postulating implicit potentials of meaning within the accepted norms and beliefs. It will describe its epistemology as one of hermeneutic interpretation, and it will answer the question of justification by pointing out the necessary commitment of participants to the consequences of an authentic interpretation of their beliefs. By contrast, a 3 Titus Stahl, "Habermas and the Project of Immanent Critique" Pre-review version -not suitable for citation.
practice-based strategy will need to elaborate some kind of social ontology of norms within social practices. It will then have to propose at least a partly social scientific account of the epistemic access we can have to such norms, and it will answer the question of justification by describing how persons can justify demands for social change on the basis of their participation in social practices. The vagueness of this description already shows that, in contrast to the hermeneutic models, practice-based forms of social critique must differ considerably in their respective interpretation of their ontological, epistemic and justificatory commitments. Thus, any specific model of practice-based critical theory must be judged on the merits of its particular responses to these problems.
Habermas and the Project of Immanent Critique
Before Habermas' theory can be examined as an example of immanent critique, it must first be shown that this is not a misnomer, especially in the light of Habermas' explicit rejection of this description.
From its very beginning, Habermas' development of a theory of communicative rationality was a response to the exhaustion of the theoretical force of several classic models of justifying social critique. Already in the eyes of the first generation of the Frankfurt School, the Marxist model, which is based on the interests and experiences of the working class, appears outdated, both empirically and theoretically. However, only two decades after World War II, the competing model of Adorno and Horkheimer is also unable to provide answers to new theoretical and political developments. 8 In his early attempts to reconsider the prospects of a philosophically guided critique of society,
Habermas begins to address this seeming impasse by developing an account of an emancipatory social science that is both normatively useful and more than just a reconstruction of some particular normative standpoint. Such an ambitious form of critical theory not only requires a methodology that avoids scientific positivism -for which all talk of normative potentials within social reality is inadmissible from the start -but must also, as Habermas clearly recognizes, avoid a narrowly hermeneutic conception of social science. 9 Habermas' systematic objections against hermeneutics as a general foundation for a philosophy of social science are well known. 10 However, one can only fully understand why he holds that an on which a critique of society can draw. 20 In developing this conception, Habermas not only subscribes to the claim that there are some normative potentials within communicative forms of social interaction, but also to the stronger claim that the relevant social practices are (at least partially) an embodiment of rationality. This stronger claim is justified by the following argument: We can understand the general concept of rationality only by reference to the concept of a valid reason which, in turn, has its primary place within practices of communication and argumentation, which is to say, in practices of exchange of speech acts. While speech acts can be used strategically, even their strategic use depends on "illocutionary force" which stems from a non-strategic "original mode of language use".
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This "original" mode is characterized by an orientation towards mutual understanding and agreement in regard to the validity claims raised. However, in order to be able to understand their speech acts as raising such validity claims, the participants must ascribe to each other not only this orientation towards mutual understanding, but also -at least in the more demanding forms of postconventional discourse -the acceptance of certain norms of discourse which prohibit the arbitrary exclusion of arguments or speakers, and which obligate speakers to formulate their practical demands in view of the generalizable interests of everybody. 22 Hence, the practice of communicative action contains within itself a potential for rationality that Habermas terms "communicative rationality." This social lifeworld is not traditionally enforced, but rather reproduces itself through communicative processes that do not presuppose the validity of traditional norms.
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In this way, the lifeworld is -in modern societies -both a structural precondition of communicative action and the result of social integration through communication. 33 Habermas' concept of the lifeworld introduces a component which cannot be described without empirical and historical vocabularies, and so suggests a picture of normativity that is at least partially one of social immanence. The suppression of communicative rationality through colonization by system imperatives is supposed to explain not only pathologies -i.e. tendencies of a self-undermining rationalization process -but also the normative source of social protests against rationalization.
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While Critical Theory is not directly guiding such protests, it can at least articulate the contrast between communicative ideals and the processes against which these social protests are directed.
On this last issue however, Habermas theory is surprisingly cautious: It is unclear, however, how far this third standpoint really constitutes a self-standing perspective. 52 If, as Habermas suggests, the narrative perspective -in which the lifeworld can, in contrast to the participant perspective, become thematic -indeed enables "statements about the reproduction or self-maintenance" 53 of the lifeworld, it is not obvious how exactly this perspective can be conceptually distinguished from the sociological one; nor is it clear that such statements must necessarily presuppose an unproblematic character of the lifeworld norms. If we were indeed able to adopt a self-standing formal pragmatic perspective in which the normative foundations of the lifeworld nevertheless could become thematic, the question would necessarily arise whether such a perspective also allows us to criticize these norms as, for example, effects of power. An answer to this question that remained committed to the unproblematic character of these norms would raise numerous objections as to whether a theory of communicative action could use this idealizing perspective to reconstruct binding normative presuppositions, or whether it would not rather deserve the same criticism which Habermas had Titus Stahl, "Habermas and the Project of Immanent Critique" Pre-review version -not suitable for citation.
originally reserved for the hermeneutic theories.
On the other hand, if Habermas allowed for sociological insights into the empirically given social practices and institutions of the lifeworld to genuinely contribute to the understanding of the normative force of communicative action, it would no longer be obvious that we can indeed understand the force of all aspects of communicative normativity from the perspective of its internal logic. 54 Most importantly, the issue would remain unsolved whether we are allowed to neglect the question whether the institutional foundations of communicative normativity also include non-communicative social relations. 55 This question, which will be discussed more extensively in the following section, cannot be answered without a more substantial account of the social ontology of the lifeworld.
(II) The conflation between normative function and social ontology: Since Habermas considers the combination of a theory of social evolution and formal pragmatics to be sufficient to understand the normative constitution of the lifeworld, he commits himself to an implicit social ontology that amounts to a radical form of social ontological monism. More specifically, since
Habermas assumes that, from within the formal pragmatic perspective, we must understand all traditional forms of symbolic consensus to have been replaced by communicative agreement 56 in modernity, and because he endorses the thesis that communicative action is -again, from within this perspective -sufficient to understand the reproduction of modern lifeworlds, 57 he is committed to the thesis that we can answer all constitutive questions within the social ontology of immanent norms with a theory of communication. Moreover, because he identifies the normatively relevant accomplishments of the lifeworld -from its internal perspective -as consisting in its capacity for communicative rationality, and because he analyzes the binding force of the relevant norms as operating only through communicative validity claims, he restricts the analysis of the mode of institution of lifeworld norms to those processes which can be described within a model of communicative reproduction. 58 Habermas thus effectively argues from the premise that we -as participants -can only understand those norms to have binding force which we can also understand as being, in principle, justifiable in discourse, and he takes this premise to imply the truth of a social ontological thesis about the mode of institution of critical norms. The validity of this implication depends, however, on the assumption that we can derive insights in social theory from a lifeworld standpoint and effectively entails a "conceptualization of society from philosophical premisses". would not need to understand the entire normative force of critique as in principle explicable within a communicative standpoint. This critical theory would then be able to recognize critical potentials even within practices that do not accord a privileged role to communicative action. 64 But as long as competing accounts of social ontology -that is, of the mode of institution of norms -that rely on such structures are not even considered, critical theory is condemned to get only as much potential for rationality out of the lifeworld as it has conceptually invested into it, since it restricts itself to those forms of the reproduction of normativity that are singled out for normative reasons.
(III) The problematic distinction between lifeworld and system: The exclusion of non-communicative elements of the lifeworld from Habermas' social ontology is closely connected to his contrast between lifeworld and "system". While the analytical distinction between these two modes of integration has considerable advantages for his theory of rationalization, it is dangerous insofar as it leads Habermas ultimately to accept a functionalist analysis of social integration as described from the third-person perspective. 65 Even though, in
Habermas' view, all forms of systemic integration presuppose the irreducible existence of a communicatively integrated lifeworld because "they have to be institutionalized", 66 his narrow conception of the social ontology of lifeworld normativity leads him to rigidly separate processes of communicative integration from processes of systemic integration. Although the conditions of 13 Titus Stahl, "Habermas and the Project of Immanent Critique" Pre-review version -not suitable for citation. systemic integration are instituted by communicative agreement, they do not draw upon such agreement. 67 Hence, they must be described as free from any relevant internal normative conflicts. 68 Thus, for conceptual reasons, normatively relevant social conflicts can only be caused by the tendency of the spheres of systemic social integration to violate the norms of clearly distinguishable social practices in the communicatively structured lifeworld. 69 This feature of Habermas' analysis excludes any theoretical attempt to understand the normative institutionalization of systemic coordination mechanisms in a way that allows for the question whether there are normative attitudes or expectations built into non-communicative practices which these mechanisms can frustrate or fulfill. 
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If Habermas were to strengthen his anti-functionalist thesis in this way he might conceive of systemic coordination not as a self-regulating sphere of non-normative mechanisms, but rather, as I will suggest in more detail in the next section, as a distinct type of second-order normative self-regulation of social practices. This perspective would provide him with resources for a normative critique of colonization. However, it would also require Habermas to give up the social ontological monism of communicative action, because he would need to ascribe normative potentials to non-communicatively instituted practices.
Ambiguities of the Model of Critique
Having argued that Habermas does not develop the social ontology of communicative action in a satisfying way, I now want to argue that the ambiguities of Habermas' social ontology of normativity, and especially those concerning the degree of independence of communicatively generated normative force from power and domination, have substantive normative implications
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for his mode of social critique.
We can examine the extent to which immanent norms of communication can provide a standard for social critique at three levels: Habermas has previously attempted to formulate a more substantial account of social critique using a model of universalizable interests, 74 and while this model remains central for his discourse ethics, 75 he more or less gives up on the attempt to derive significant conclusions for a large-scale critical social theory from this line of thought. 76 Habermas describes the critique on the second level as a critique of "systematically distorted Habermas uses the latter expression to describe processes of mediatization which lead to fragmentation, delegitimization, cultural impoverishment and disintegration. especially to the loss of the capacity of communicative processes to continue to perform their functions of legitimation and of integration of the self and the community, rather than to violations of normative expectations that inhere in the communicative process itself.
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It has been widely objected that this functional criterion is neither able to provide a standard that allows to distinguish (normatively) legitimate from illegitimate delinguistification ("Entsprachlichung") nor a standard which would be suited to criticize colonization from the perspective of communicative rationality.
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In other words, it is argued that this form of critique is incapable of justifying particular demands for social change employing the norms immanent in communicative practices, rather than relying on the implicit premise that dysfunctionalities of symbolic integration are, as such, normatively problematic. Hence, to develop a plausible social ontology, we must rather focus on the different modes in which shared social norms can be instituted, and on the internal potentials these modes offer for critique. This analysis must be guided by the hope that clarifying the social authority of critique will furnish new criteria to distinguish changes to structures of social norms that are rational and inclusive from illegitimate normative transitions that rest on power structures which only pretend to have a claim to legitimate acceptance.
89
Of course, such a model of a critical social ontology needs much more elaboration to be
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plausible.
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However, if we could make sense of the idea that there are unrealized normative potentials in social practices, we might be able to formulate a richer account of the normative basis of the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate delinguistification. This is because, on such an account, it is possible to distinguish between various types of practices that institute different kinds of second-order norms to regulate the entitlements of the participants in regard to their role in the administration of first-order, social norms. In some practices, the mode of practical authority ascription implies that the participants are not normatively entitled to demand justifications for certain interpretations of the rules of the practice. Other practices, in contrast, involve forms of recognition which constitute a mutual ascription of entitlements to a communicative justification of controversial normative evaluations. When practices of the first type are integrated into systems of media-based coordination, this does not necessarily produce violations of normative expectations. However, practices of the second type must be described as pathological in a normative sense whenever their participants are forced to submit to rules that effectively undermine their normative status, because this amounts to a structural violation of the entitlements that are constitutive of the practice in question. We could, for example, understand the colonization of educational institutions by money or administrative power in this sense. That is, one could claim that there are practices in educational institutions that constitutively depend on a reciprocal recognition that the participants are entitled to justification for all relevant demands made upon them. As soon as such practices are constrained by rules which prevent this recognition from becoming explicit as demands for justification, then participants are forced to treat all conflicts within the practice as merely strategic, and are thereby prevented from realizing the entitlements that are constitutive of their recognitive statuses within this practice.
To describe conflicts over colonization in this way, however, entails a fundamental revision of Habermas' theory. To speak of a conflict between suppressed practice-immanent normative expectations on the one hand, and second-order norms that prevent them from becoming explicit on the other hand, necessarily presumes that there are sources of normativity beyond those elements of the lifeworld which can -at least in principle -become explicitly thematic at any time. On such an account, the normativity of the lifeworld must originate in a structure of practical cooperation and of mutual recognition which practically institutes normative demands independently of a communicative affirmation of these norms as binding. This proposal amounts, therefore, to the claim that the normative force of communicative rationality depends, Titus Stahl, "Habermas and the Project of Immanent Critique" Pre-review version -not suitable for citation.
from a social ontological perspective, on the institution of practical demands which cannot exhaustively be described in communication terms.
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Even though this modification risks losing some of the power of Habermas' theory of rationalization, and significantly complicates the issue as to whether the standards of critique are universal, it not only allows for a normative distinction between two types of practices, it also enables the model of communicative critique to be expanded to describe forms of pathologies within systemically coordinated action spheres that Habermas is forced to remain silent about.
Specifically, we can conceive of de facto systemically organized practices where the relevant non-communicative second-order norms are not instituted by the acceptance of all participants involved, but by domination or ideology. We can, for example, conceptualize practices of collaboration in industrial or service work as social practices with inbuilt normative demands that particular organizational arrangements be justified, which are not allowed to be communicatively raised within the practices themselves because the action of raising such demands is excluded from the range of actions which count as a part of these practices. A critique of this type of forced delinguistification must be based on a normative criterion which distinguishes different practices based on their internal normative organization. Only then it becomes possible to formulate a social critique of such practices that justifies why they should not remain subsumed under a functional logic, as opposed to only explaining why such a subsumption cannot occur without a loss of meaning.
Conclusion
Even though the methodological issue of immanent critique is rarely labeled as such, it remains crucial for contemporary critical theory. As an influential exponent of immanent criticismalbeit implicitly -Habermas' paradigm shift in the Theory of Communicative Action has provided both new resources and new problems. In particular, his account of the social foundations of communicative action -even though normatively attractive -tends to obstruct our view of the complex preconditions of institutional reality, and thus obscures the plurality of normative arrangements that underlie these practices. Hence, a convincing reformulation of immanent critique will have to go beyond his model by explicitly addressing the social ontology of the normative potentials of social practices, for example, by drawing on recent attempts to connect the current discussions in analytic philosophy with the theory of recognition. In this respect, I suggest a different methodological approach than that which is exemplified in Cooke, Representing the Good Society, ch. 6.
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Of course this introduces a set of difficulties into the very concept of a "social ontology" that contemporary analytic accounts in this field do not envisage, especially with regard to the relationship between social ontology and rationality. This suggestion does not imply that these difficulties are already solved, but rather advocates a change in methodology. Specifically, I argue that we should approach the issue by questioning what constitutes the force of social critique, and by then working towards an evaluation of the rationality of critical claims, rather than starting the other way around, that is, with a strong notion of rationality that narrows our focus to include only the most rational forms of practices. 
